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ARE THE U.K.’S PAYMENT-BY-RESULTS PROGRAMS 
RIGHT FOR U.S. PRISONS?† 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States is the most incarcerated country in the world,1 whose most 
recent population calculations reached over 1.5 million people behind bars in 
2015.2 The price of housing for the world’s largest prison population to 
American taxpayers is over $80 billion per year.3 By comparison, between 2016 
and 2017 the United Kingdom only spent £2.9 billion, or $4.2 billion, housing 
its average prison population of 84,705.4  
Not only is the American prison system costly to taxpayers, it is also costly 
to inmates. In a recent study it was found that 21% of male inmates had been 
assaulted over a six-month period, either by their fellow inmates or prison staff.5 
Sexual assault, in addition to other acts of violence, is also prevalent throughout 
U.S. prisons.6 In 2011 alone, there were 8,763 allegations of sexual assault or 
sexual victimization reported.7 Looking to other countries to determine if 
punishment can be provided in a more cost-efficient way can improve the current 
state of America’s criminal justice system.  
To improve prison efficiency and performance, certain pro-incentive prison 
reform advocates suggest that the criminal justice system should use 
performance-based contracts to fund prisons based on reaching specific 
performance measures or outcomes.8 Over the last decade, the use of 
performance-based contracts has quickly spread to various countries across the 
 
 † This Comment focuses on prison systems, therefore this Comment will refer to prisoners, inmates and 
offenders interchangeably. 
 1 John Surico, How America Became the Most Imprisoned Nation in the World, VICE (Oct. 2015), 
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/avy474/america-incarcerated-0000765-v22n10. 
 2 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 250229, PRISONERS IN 2015 (Dec. 2016). 
 3 Peter Wagner and Bernadette Rabuy, Following the Money of Mass Incarceration, PRISON POLICY 
INITIATIVE (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/money.html. 
 4 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, COSTS PER PLACE AND COSTS PER PRISONER BY INDIVIDUAL PRISON, October 26, 
2017 (U.K.).  
 5 Nancy Wolff and Jing Shi, Contextualization of Physical and Sexual Assault in Male Prisons: Incidents 
and Their Aftermath, 15 J. CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE 58, 58 (Jan. 2, 2009).  
 6 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 243904, SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION 
REPORTED BY ADULT CORRECTIONAL AUTHORITIES, 2009–11 (Jan. 2014).  
 7 Id.  
 8 See Alexander Volokh, Prison Accountability and Performance Measures, 63 EMORY L.J. 339 (2013). 
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globe.9 Currently, “there are more than 70 projects in 18 countries, with 16 
projects in the U.S.,” all featuring slightly different approaches to a 
performance-based contract.10 The use of performance-based contracts in 
prisons originated in the United Kingdom.11 Over the last decade, the United 
Kingdom has successfully used a “payment-by-results” (PbR) program for 
paying private prison contractors based on their ability to lower reconviction 
rates (also referred to as recidivism rates) by certain percentage points in two of 
its private prisons.12 Though payment-based contracts are being used across the 
world, the United Kingdom’s use of PbR will be the focus of this Comment. 
This Comment argues that the U.K.’s pilot private prison PbR programs, in 
which they compensate prison contractors based on reductions in reconviction 
rates, are appropriate for use in the U.S.’s federal and state prisons—both public 
and private. To make this argument, this Comment will examine the effects of 
the U.K.’s PbR programs in its prisons, health, and employment sectors; explore 
the potential advantages and disadvantages of a PbR program; and directly apply 
the U.K.’s PbR prison pilot programs to the federal and state governments in the 
United States. To conclude, this Comment will argue that the two U.K. private 
prison PbR pilot programs currently used by the United Kingdom can serve as 
models for jurisdictions in the United States when designing their own PbR 
programs, but that the United States cannot directly apply these models to all 
state and federal prisons due to the need for PbR programs to be designed 
specifically for the exact prison it is going to be implemented in.  
Though this Comment will argue that the United Kingdom’s PbR programs 
should not be used directly in the United States, designing and proscribing a 
particular PbR model is outside the scope of this Comment due to the specificity 
required for designing PbR programs. Instead, this Comment will explain certain 
factors that jurisdictions in the United States should consider when determining 
whether to implement PbR programs.  
Part I of this Comment will provide background information on 
incarceration and recidivism in both the United States and United Kingdom, and 
background information on the U.K.’s use of PbR programs throughout its 
 
 9 See id.; Oklahoma approves first-ever Pay for Success contract addressing female incarceration, THE 
NORMAN TRANSCRIPT (Apr. 12, 2017), http://www.normantranscript.com/news/oklahoma-approves-first-ever-
pay-for-success-contract-addressing-female/article_3005ca3e-1ef6-11e7-94b0-4f6fcb6a5f7b.html. 
 10 THE NORMAN TRANSCRIPT, supra note 9.  
 11 Id. at 2. 
 12 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, STATISTICAL NOTICE, INTERIM RE-CONVICTION FIGURES FOR THE 
PETERBOROUGH AND DONCASTER PAYMENT BY RESULTS PILOTS, 1, 2013 (U.K.) [hereinafter STATISTICAL 
NOTICE].  
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government. Additionally, Part I will describe the U.K.’s PbR prison pilot 
programs at Peterborough, Doncaster, and Leeds, and will touch on the growth 
of PbR programs across the world. Subsequently, Part II will analyze the 
advantages and disadvantages of PbR programs based on the research and results 
from Peterborough and Doncaster. Part III will discuss the applicability of the 
U.K.’s PbR prison pilots in U.S. federal and state prisons. To conclude, Parts IV 
and V will address some potential criticisms of this proposition and draw 
together some concluding thoughts. 
I. INTRODUCTION TO PAYMENT-BY-RESULTS 
A. Incarceration and Recidivism in the United States and United Kingdom 
1. The United States 
As previously mentioned, the United States houses the largest incarcerated 
population in the world.13 At the end of 2015, the United States had an estimated 
1,520,800 prisoners under the jurisdiction of state and federal correctional 
authorities.14 Roughly 90% of these inmates are held in state prisons.15 The U.S. 
prison population at the end of 2015 marked the lowest population since 2005 
and represented a 2% decrease in the prison population from 2014.16 Even with 
this decrease in prisoners, the U.S. prison population still greatly outnumbered 
any other country’s prison population. This high prison population leads to high 
costs of running and maintaining correctional facilities.17 The Bureau of Justice 
Statistics (BJS) reported that in 2012 total expenditures of corrections at all 
levels of the government totaled $80.7 billion.18 
Arguably, this high cost could be justified if the criminal justice system 
successfully prepared inmates for life after release, but recidivism rates19 among 
previously incarcerated individuals in the U.S. are high.20 After following 
 
 13 Surico, supra note 1. 
 14 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 2.  
 15 Austill Stuart, New Zealand’s Recidivism-Focused Private Prison Contracts a Model for States, OUT 
OF CONTROL POLICY BLOG (Sept. 21, 2017), http://reason.org/blog/show/new-zealand-recidivism-prison. 
 16 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 2. 
 17  Wagner & Rabuy, supra note 3. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Recidivism is defined as the “tendency to relapse into a previous condition or mode of behavior.” 
Recidivism, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/recidivism. 
 20 See Stuart, supra note 15.  
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federal offenders for eight years post-release,21 a study found that out of “almost 
one-half of federal offenders released in 2005, 49.3%, were arrested for a new 
crime or rearrested for a violation of supervision conditions.”22 It is difficult to 
gather data regarding state recidivism rates due to differences in state law and 
the longitudinal nature of recidivism studies; however, it has been found that 
“when excluding California, whose size skews the national picture, recidivism 
rates between 1994 and 2007 have consistently remained around 40%.”23 More 
recently, a 2014 BJS report across thirty states found that “about two-thirds 
(67.8%) of released prisoners were arrested for a new crime within 3 years, and 
three-quarters (76.6%) were arrested within 5 years.”24 
State and federal government often contract out their incarceration facilities' 
management to private prison companies.25 Governments seek bids from private 
prison companies to establish a new private prison; once a private prison 
company wins, it begins running the daily operations of the facility and assume 
legal liability while being paid by the government.26 The use and origins of 
private prisons started in the United States in 1983 with the founding of 
Corrections Corporation of America.27 In 2015, the number of prisoners in 
private prisons was just 8% of the total U.S. prison population28—“about 
126,000 prisoners were held in privately operated facilities under the jurisdiction 
of 29 states and the federal Bureau of Prisons.”29 This population represents an 
8% decrease in private prison population since its peak in 2012.30 
 
 21 The United States Sentencing Commission began an eight-year longitudinal study in 2005 which 
tracked 25,431 federal offenders in the community after being released from prison or on probation. See U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, RECIDIVISM AMONG FEDERAL OFFENDERS: A COMPREHENSIVE OVERVIEW (Mar. 2016). 
 22 Id. 
 23 PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, STATE OF RECIDIVISM: THE REVOLVING DOOR OF AMERICA’S PRISONS (Apr. 
2011). See also BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 244205, RECIDIVISM OF 
PRISONERS RELEASED IN 30 STATES IN 2005: PATTERNS FROM 2005–2010 (Apr. 2014) [hereinafter 30 STATE 
RECIDIVISM PATTERNS]. 
 24 30 STATE RECIDIVISM PATTERNS, supra note 23.  
 25 Brett C. Burkhardt, Private prisons, explained, THE CONVERSATION (Mar. 20, 2017), http:// 
theconversation.com/private-prisons-explained-73038. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Madison Pauly, A Brief History of America’s Private Prison Industry, MOTHER JONES (2016), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/06/history-of-americas-private-prison-industry-timeline/. 
 28 Abigail Geiger, U.S. private prison population has declined in recent years, PEW RESEARCH CENTER 
(Apr. 11, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/11/u-s-private-prison-population-has-declined-
in-recent-years/. 
 29 Id.  
 30 Id.  
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2. The United Kingdom 
According to the most recent counts, the United Kingdom’s total prison 
population stands at 86,256.31 In 2008, the cost of housing an inmate in the 
United Kingdom is approximately £40,000 (or $51,012 in 2018 USD) per year.32 
The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) publishes proven reoffending statistics every 
quarter, which represent the amount of people who have been reconvicted for 
reoffending.33 According to the most recent statistics, “the overall proven 
reoffending rate was 24.8%,” which is a decrease from the previous quarter.34 
The United Kingdom began contracting with private prison companies in the 
1990s.35 As of 2012, there were fourteen private prisons in the U.K.,36 which 
made up 15% of the country’s prisons.37 
B. The History and Development of Payment-by-Results Programs in the U.K. 
Traditionally, social programs focus on the outputs of the program which are 
“the tangible and intangible products that result from project activities,” such as 
the number of people who are released from prison or who gain employment.38 
Whereas PbR programs focus on outcomes that are “the benefits that a project 
or intervention is designed to deliver,” such as reduced recidivism or lower 
unemployment rates.39 A PbR system “allows the government to pay a service 
provider on the basis of the outcomes their service achieves rather than the inputs 
or outputs the provider delivers.”40 The theory behind PbR is that it will 
encourage private prison providers “to focus on ends, not means, and is seen as 
a means of promoting improvements in public services.”41 Advocates of PbR 
 
 31 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, POPULATION BULLETIN: WEEKLY 20 OCTOBER 2017 (U.K.). 
 32 Kevin Marsh, The real cost of prison, THE GUARDIAN (July 28, 2008), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
commentisfree/2008/jul/28/justice.prisonsandprobation. 
 33 See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, PROVEN REOFFENDING STATISTICS QUARTERLY BULLETIN, OCTOBER 2014 
TO SEPTEMBER 2015 (U.K.). 
 34 Marsh, supra note 32.  
 35 Private Prisons, POLITICS.CO.UK (2012), http://www.politics.co.uk/reference/private-prisons. 
 36 Id.  
 37 Sam Dean, Is this the end of private prisons?, THE TELEGRAPH (Feb. 18, 2017), http://www.telegraph. 
co.uk/business/2017/02/18/end-private-prisons/. 
 38 DEP’T OF INT’L DEV., INDICATORS OF INPUTS, ACTIVITIES, OUTPUTS, OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS IN 
SECURITY AND JUSTICE PROGRAMMING, 6 (Oct. 15, 2013) (U.K.). 
 39 Id.  
 40 Kevin Albertson & Chris Fox, Payment by Results and Social Impact Bonds in the Criminal Justice 
System Sector: New Challenges for the Concept of Evidence-based policy?, CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 1 (2011). 
 41 Fraser Battye and Mike Daly, Payment by Results in public service reform: silver bullet, dangerous 
weapon, neither, both?, 1 (July 2012), https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.247193!/file/C1_daly.pdf. 
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claim it will lead to greater efficiency, more innovation, transfer of risk, and 
encourage new market entrants42—a claim which will be discussed in more 
detail in Part II. 
The idea of PbR in the United Kingdom was first introduced into the 
country’s National Health Service (NHS) in the early 2000s, when providers 
were paid for the number and type of patients treated.43 One of the focuses of 
the program was to “improve fairness and transparency of the payment 
systems.”44 After several years of implementation, researchers at the King’s 
Fund, a health charity, found that PbR in the NHS contributed to “rapid 
reductions in lengths of stay,” compared to Scotland where PbR was not 
implemented as a control.45 Additionally, the researchers noted that there was 
little evidence that PbR had a negative impact on quality of the health services 
and that the ability to earn extra payments was not being used.46 
In June 2011, the U.K. implemented another PbR program, the Work 
Programme, which paid contractors and employers based on their ability to hire 
and maintain employment of those who were previously classified as “long-term 
unemployed.”47 This program began “with the primary aim of helping the long-
term unemployed back into work for [sustainable] periods of time.”48 People 
who had been out of the work force between nine and twelve months were 
referred to the program and assigned to different groups based on personal 
characteristics.49 Later, contractors or employers were paid based on their ability 
to provide sustained employment for participants of the program.50 After three 
years, the Work Programme was able to refer 1.6 million people, and 687,000 
people were able to maintain employment for two years, thereby saving the 
government £21 million by “extrapolating invalid job outcome payments and 
reducing payments to prime contractors accordingly.”51 Though the Work 
Programme experienced some success, a majority of the participants were 
 
 42 Albertson & Fox, supra note 40, at 4–7.  
 43 Id. at 4. 
 44 Id.  
 45 John Appleby, Tony Harrison, Loraine Hawkins & Anna Dixon, Payment by Results: How can 
payment systems help deliver better care?, THE KING’S FUND (2012). 
 46 Id.  
 47 Case Study: The UK’s Work Programme for the unemployed, Centre for Public Impact (Apr. 18, 2016), 
https://www.centreforpublicimpact.org/case-study/uk-work-programme/ [hereinafter Centre for Public Impact]. 
 48 Id.  
 49 Id.  
 50 Id. 
 51 NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE, THE WORK PROGRAMME, 2014–2015, HC 266, at 4 (U.K.).  
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unable to find sustained employment.52 
C. The State of Implementation of Prison PbR Programs in the United 
Kingdom 
After seeing the results of PbR in health services, a Green Paper53 was 
published in 2010 in which the MOJ committed to starting a number of PbR 
pilot programs in several of their prisons.54 After the Green Paper, two pilot 
programs were started, each of which used different types of PbR programs.55 
The first pilot program took place at Her Majesty’s Prison (HMP) Peterborough 
and began on September 9, 2010.56 The second pilot program was implemented 
over a year later on October 1, 2011 at HMP Doncaster.57 Both pilot programs 
focused on reducing reoffending rates as their measure of success.58 A third pilot 
program that focused on reducing reconviction rates was also slated to take place 
at HMP Leeds, one of the country’s publicly-run facilities; it was later cancelled 
due to market failure.59 While the two pilot programs that ran used different PbR 
programs, the MOJ determined their results by using a “12-month re-conviction 
measure, which counts offenses committed in the 12 months following release 
from prison, and resulting in conviction at court either in those 12 months or in 
a further 6-month period (allowing time for cases to progress through the 
courts).”60 A more in-depth analysis of each prison and its PbR pilot program 
follows.  
1. HMP Peterborough 
HMP Peterborough, which began its PbR pilot program in 2010, uses a 
social impact bond to finance the program.61 A Social Impact Bond is “a public-
 
 52 Centre for Public Impact, supra note 47.  
 53 A Green Paper in the United Kingdom is “a preliminary report of government proposals that is 
published in order to provoke discussion.” Green Paper, OXFORDDICTIONARIES.COM, https://en. 
oxforddictionaries.com/definition/green_paper.  
 54 STATISTICAL NOTICE, supra note 13, at 1. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id.  
 57 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, HMP DONCASTER PAYMENT BY RESULTS PILOT: FINAL PROCESS EVALUATION 
REPORT, 2015 (U.K.) [hereinafter DONCASTER FINAL EVALUATION REPORT].  
 58  Ministry of Justice, Payment by results prison pilot continues to show falls in reoffending, Gov.UK 
(2014), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/payment-by-results-prison-pilot-continues-to-show-falls-in-
reoffending. 
 59 Max Chambers, Expanding Payment-by-Results, POLICY EXCHANGE (2013). 
 60 STATISTICAL NOTICE, supra note 12 at 1.  
 61 Jake Anders and Richard Dorsett, A review of the matching process for the impact analysis of the HMP 
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private partnership where one or more investor(s) provide upfront capital for the 
realization of public projects that generate verifiable social and/or environmental 
outcomes.”62 Typically under a Social Impact Bond, the government contracts 
out to an intermediary who will raise the capital for the project from investors 
and find a service provider to deliver the outcomes.63 If the project achieves the 
desired outcomes, the Government pays the intermediary and the investors.64 If 
the project fails, the investors will lose out on their investment.65 The Social 
Impact Bond at Peterborough was coordinated by Social Finance, a nonprofit 
organization that raised capital from private investors for the pilot.66 The MOJ 
and the Big Lottery Fund agreed to pay back these investors with interest 
“ranging from 2.5% to 13%”67 if the pilot “reduced reoffending by 7.5% 
overall.”68  
In an attempt to reduce reconviction rates, the pilot implemented the One 
Service program, funded by the Social Impact Bond.69 The One Service program 
provided for “no fixed intervention model or single theory of change,” and 
therefore allowed for a mix of activities to be individually proscribed to each 
offender based on their specific needs as determined by caseworkers.70 Contact 
with cohort members of the pilot was made before release and continued for up 
to twelve months after release.71 To determine what each offender needed to 
reduce their risk of reoffending, “a needs assessment was developed with 
providers and local specialist agencies.”72 The One Service program was 
delivered by “voluntary and community sector providers,” who were 
compensated for their work.73 Some of the staff members and volunteers who 
directly dealt with the prisoners in the program were prior offenders, which 
proved useful in engaging the offenders in the program.74 The success of the 
 
Peterborough Social Impact Bond, NAT’L INST. OF ECON. AND SOC. RES. (June, 2017). 
 62 Social and Development Impact Bonds (Results-Based Financing), UNDP, http://www.undp.org/ 
content/sdfinance/en/home/solutions/social-development-impact-bonds.html. 
 63 Id.  
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Anders & Dorsett, supra note 61. 
 67 Social and Development Impact Bonds, supra note 62.  
 68 Anders & Dorsett, supra note 61. 
 69 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, PHASE 2 REPORT FROM THE PAYMENT BY RESULTS SOCIAL IMPACT BOND PILOT 
AT HMP PETERBOROUGH, 2014, at 1 (U.K.) [hereinafter PETERBOROUGH PHASE 2 REPORT].  
 70 Id.  
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at 3.  
 73 Id. at 1. 
 74 Id. at 4. 
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One Service program can be linked to its ability to take into account local context 
when trying to solve a “locally defined problem.”75 Additionally, the program 
served as a gap filler between existing programs and offered hands-on support 
for offenders.76 
Throughout the pilot program, the MOJ published both interim and final 
results.77 The final results of the Peterborough pilot looked at the “frequency of 
re-conviction events, based on offenses committed within 12 months of release 
from prison and conviction at court within those 12 month or a further 6 month 
period.”78 The interim results were based on periods half the length of those used 
in the final results.79 Peterborough’s success was determined by a comparison 
of a “control group of comparable offenders from across the country.”80 Halfway 
through the pilot there was a 6% “fall in the frequency of re-conviction events 
at Peterborough while nationally there [was] a substantial rise.”81 At the end of 
the pilot, across the two cohorts that were measured, there was an estimated fall 
in the frequency of reconviction events of 9%, thereby triggering the outcome 
payment, allowing the Social Impact Bond investors to receive their money from 
the government.82 
2. HMP Doncaster 
HMP Doncaster is a private prison which, under the PbR contract, was 
managed by the private public services company, Serco, alongside two 
community organizations, Catch 22 and Turning.83 The aim of the pilot was to 
reduce recidivism.84 Under the PbR contract, if Serco reduced the reconviction 
rate by 5%, it would retain the full contract value. If they reduced the 
reconviction rate by more than 5%, it would trigger additional outcome 
payments.85 
 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. at 5. 
 77 See STATISTICAL NOTICE, supra note 12; DONCASTER FINAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 58.  
 78 STATISTICAL NOTICE, supra note 12, at 2. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 3. 
 81 Id. at 5. 
 82 Anders & Dorsett, supra note 61. 
 83 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, FINDINGS AND LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
HMP DONCASTER PAYMENT BY RESULTS PILOT 1, 3 (Nov. 2012) (U.K.) [hereinafter FINDINGS FROM DONCASTER 
PILOT]. 
 84 Id. at i. 
 85 Id. at 4.  
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To reduce reconviction rates, the key feature of the Doncaster pilot was its 
use of an Alliance model between the three aforementioned parties.86 One of the 
main changes the managers introduced in Doncaster was the implementation of 
community resettlement support and case management.87 Upon arrival to 
Doncaster, cohort members were assigned a case manager.88 The case manager 
went through the MegaNexus needs assessment with the prisoner and provided 
a support plan based on the results.89 MegaNexus is an electronic case 
management system used by Doncaster to track management data.90 Rather than 
deliver services directly, the case manager would simply provide access to 
interventions and services recommended by the support plan.91 No new 
interventions were put into place after the start of the PbR pilot.92 Another facet 
of the pilot program was that Serco would be responsible for accredited 
programs, while Catch 22 dealt with case management.93  
The MOJ also published interim and final results throughout the pilot for 
Doncaster as it did for the Peterborough pilot.94 The final results of the Doncaster 
pilot were based on “the proportion of offenders who commit one or more 
offences in the 12 months following release from prison and are convicted at 
court in those 12 months or in a further 6 months.”95 The interim results at 
Doncaster were also based on periods half the length of those used in the final 
results.96 The success of Doncaster was determined by comparing the results 
with the baseline reconviction rate that was calculated from the 2009 calendar 
year.97 Halfway through the pilot, the re-conviction frequency at Doncaster fell 
by 4.9% compared to the baseline year.98 At the end of the Doncaster pilot, the 
reconviction rate fell 3.3% as compared to the baseline year, did not meet the 
5% threshold, and therefore did not trigger the outcome payment.99 
 
 86 Id. at i. 
 87 Id. at ii.  
 88 Id. at 12. 
 89 Id. at 15. 
 90 Id..  
 91 Id. at 18–19.  
 92 Id. at 19. 
 93 Id. at ii. 
 94 See STATISTICAL NOTICE, supra note 12. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. at 2. 
 98 Id. at 6. 
 99 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, HMP DONCASTER: PAYMENT BY RESULTS PILOT, FINAL RE-CONVICTION 
RESULTS FOR COHORT 1, 2 (July 2015) (U.K.) [hereinafter DONCASTER COHORT 2 FINAL RESULTS]. 
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3. HMP Leeds 
HMP Leeds was slated to be the first ever public prison to be funded using 
a PbR program.100 In 2012, the MOJ began the procurement process and later 
closed the competition because only one of six potential providers decided to 
pursue the prison contract.101 The Leeds model was supposed to involve a 
“public/private partnership, where a new joint venture would be set up and 
services jointly run, with risk transferred to the private sector.”102 Though the 
Leeds pilot program did not come to fruition due to market failure,103 its proposal 
stands for the proposition that PbR programs can and should be considered for 
use in both public and private institutions. 
Overall, the two completed prison PbR pilot programs at Peterborough and 
Doncaster have shown some successes. Though both Peterborough and 
Doncaster were able to reduce reconviction rates, Doncaster was unable to meet 
the desired threshold to trigger the final outcome payment.104 Additionally, 
despite both pilots having used the same performance measure of reducing 
reconviction rates, comparing the two pilots is difficult as they both employed 
different models and used different methods within the prisons themselves to 
achieve their goals.  
In 2015, the National Audit Office (NAO) released a report discussing the 
government’s use of PbR throughout its various departments.105 Based on the 
United Kingdom’s use of PbR, the NAO found that PbR contracts are “a 
technically challenging form of contracting and [have] attendant costs and risks 
that the government has often underestimated.”106 One such cost is that the 
commissioner must expend time and resources to monitor and manage the 
contractor to ensure they are achieving their outcomes.107 Additionally, if the 
contractor is failing to meet their outcomes the commissioner may have to step 
in and assist.108 Due to this, the NAO suggested that when the government is 
 
 100 Joe Inwood, State-run Leeds Prison to be paid on results, BBC (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.bbc.com/ 
news/uk-england-leeds-15479570. 
 101 NAT’L AUDIT OFFICE, OUTCOME-BASED PAYMENT SCHEMES: GOVERNMENT’S USE OF PAYMENT BY 
RESULTS, 2015–16 HC 86, at 27 (U.K.) [hereinafter GOVERNMENT’S USE OF PAYMENT BY RESULTS]. 
 102 Chambers, supra note 59.  
 103  Id. at 14–15. 
 104 DONCASTER COHORT 2 FINAL RESULTS, supra note 99. 
 105 GOVERNMENT’S USE OF PAYMENT BY RESULTS, supra note 101. 
 106 Id. at 7. 
 107 Id. at 8. 
 108 Id. 
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determining whether to choose PbR in the future, the “commissioners should 
justify their selection of PbR over alternative delivery mechanisms” because of 
the costs and the fact that “PbR is not suited to all public services.”109 NAO 
suggested that governments need to “actively monitor and manage provider 
performance,” which the U.K. has failed to do.110 The government has also failed 
to collect data about the effects of PbR across the various departments in which 
programs had been implemented.111 
D. The Growth of Payment-by-Results and Similar Programs in Prisons 
Across the World 
In the last decade, there has been an increase in the use and implementation 
of PbR programs in prisons around the world.112 Many of these projects are still 
in the beginning phases, and therefore published results are not available for 
analysis in this Comment. Though the following PbR programs take place 
outside of the U.K., these projects are worth mentioning because they 
demonstrate the idea that PbR design is dependent on context and local needs 
and that PbR is worth exploring in the United States. 
New Zealand’s government began experimenting with PbR in 2015 when it 
allowed a consortium led by Serco to build and operate the Auckland South 
Correctional Facility (Wiri).113 The consortium has been tasked with lowering 
recidivism rates by 10% with a special focus on reducing recidivism among 
indigenous inmates.114 In addition to receiving payments if the consortium 
lowers recidivism rates, they will also receive incentive payments if their facility 
out-performs state facilities.115 On the other hand, if there is a security incident, 
or a serious breach occurs, the consortium’s payments are reduced, or they may 
be responsible for paying a penalty.116 The New Zealand government preferred 
this model because it encouraged the manager of the prison to create change that 
could lead to better outcomes both inside and outside of the prison.117 A 
noteworthy aspect of this project is that the consortium was able to build and 
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 110 Id. at 8. 
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design Wiri in a way that allowed them to increase incentives for inmates to 
behave, and thereby reduced recidivism rates.118 Initial results from Wiri should 
be soon forthcoming and are worth analyzing in the contemplation and design 
of a PbR program in the Unites States.  
In December 2016, the Australian government opened a new women’s 
prison called Melaleuca,119 which is run by Sodexo.120 In Melaleuca, Sodexo 
will be employing support programs to help prevent inmates from reoffending 
once released.121 For compensation, Sodexo will receive a payment of $11,000 
(15,000 Australian dollars) “for every convict who does not return within two 
years” from the Australian government.122 
The use of PbR has also made its way to the United States where there are 
sixteen PbR, or pay for success (PFS)123, programs currently running.124 In 
Oklahoma, a PbR system was put into effect in early 2017 at women’s facilities 
in which the government contracted with the nonprofit organization Women in 
Recovery (WIR) to run a diversion/reentry program.125 Oklahoma contracted 
with WIR with the purpose of WIR delivering these intensive reentry programs 
in public women’s facilities in Tulsa.126 The nonprofit will receive payments for 
each successful graduate of the program.127 WIR predicts it will be able to admit 
“125 women into the program annually for up to five years.”128  
Another effort was made in 2013 in Pennsylvania where the state was able 
to renegotiate “all contracts governing its 38 community correction centers” to 
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tie performance and payment to recidivism rates.129 In the second year of the 
program, the forty-two community correction centers, or halfway houses, were 
able to reduce recidivism rates by 11.3%, marking two years of decreases by 
preparing residents to re-enter society after being released from prison.130 
II. THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF A PAYMENT-BY-RESULTS 
PROGRAM 
A. Advantages 
There are many potential advantages of employing a PbR program, some of 
which include: efficiency and resource distribution, experimentation, and 
market participation.131  
Scholars argue that PbR leads to greater efficiency by correcting “misaligned 
incentives.”132 The “principal mechanism underpinning PbR” is changing 
incentives by addressing the “principal-agent problem by aligning interests and 
incentives around the achievement of an outcome that both parties regard as 
desirable.”133 In the case of prisons, this could include: reducing recidivism,134 
overcrowding,135 assaults,136 escapes,137 and improving health care.138 In a 
normal service provider situation, the provider often does not take part in the 
benefit of that activity, but PbR allows for service providers to benefit from their 
actions by receiving a payment.139 Incentives will also be realigned due to the 
entrance of new market participants.140 As described below, service providers 
will have a greater incentive to perform and focus on outcomes to stay in 
business.141 PbR programs also allow resources to be disbursed where they will 
have the most benefit.142 For example, rather than putting resources towards 
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more security guards, money could be put towards preventative measures, job 
training, or counseling services in order to improve outcomes.143 
Another advantage of a PbR program is that it can lead to experimentation. 
By focusing on outcomes rather than inputs and outputs, PbR programs allow 
providers to find innovative solutions to reach their goals or performance 
measures.144 PbR does this by telling providers what needs to be done, rather 
than how they need to do it, thereby giving the provider an opportunity to 
experiment to achieve their goals.145 This advantage was demonstrated in the 
Peterborough pilot where the contract did not specify what needed to be done to 
improve outcomes.146 This resulted in the successful One Service program that 
was crafted based on local knowledge and context.147 Also, the government 
transfers the risk of experimenting to reach the performance measurements away 
from themselves and onto the providers by partaking in contracts.148  
Another purported advantage of a PbR program is that experimentation in 
service delivery will lead to the entry of new market participants and diverse 
service providers.149 Implementing a PbR program could allow for private and 
nonprofit organizations to come in and break up the public sector monopoly on 
a given service.150 Having multiple service providers could increase competition 
in the sector, and create competitive pressure among the market participants to 
perform and find effective means of achieving outcomes.151 Providers who do 
not perform will be replaced by those who are able to deliver favorable 
outcomes.152 This advantage of a PbR program is minimal because new market 
entry is already possible under the traditional privatization model.153 
Additionally, scholars argue that a PbR program could deter new market entry 
of small or nonprofit providers because they may be more sensitive to the risks 
associated with a PbR contract.154 Though small corporations and nonprofits 
may not be parties to a PbR contract due to financial constraints, the major 
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corporations could still tap nonprofits for help with delivering services to help 
achieve their outcomes.155 
Additional advantages of PbR programs include cost-effectiveness,156 risk 
transfer from commissioner to service provider,157 user responsiveness,158 and 
accountability.159 
B. Disadvantages 
Inherent in a PbR program are several disadvantages which involve the 
designing and implementation of the program itself and the effects on provider 
behavior.160 
One of the largest disadvantages to a PbR program is the difficulty of 
defining outcomes, or targets, that are measurably close to the desired end 
result.161 Outcomes should be clear, measurable, and aligned with the 
government’s policy objectives to ensure that the government can track 
performance, and that the provider is meeting their objectives.162 To set 
performance goals, the commissioner or government must determine the 
baseline, or non-intervention rate, in the sector based on quantitative data on that 
specific outcome.163 Setting performance goals may be challenging depending 
on the sector, but once the baseline is calculated, the commissioner or 
government should set performance goals above the non-intervention rate.164 
When dealing with the criminal justice system, it may be difficult to value 
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outcomes, such as lowered crime rates or reconviction rates.165 However, 
controlling for baselines may not be crucial “for a compensation scheme to 
provide the proper incentives for improvement” if PbR contracts are allocated 
by auction because it would result in the same price to the contractor and 
government.166 
Further, the implementation of PbR programs results in higher transaction 
costs.167 Due to the fact-specific nature of designing PbR programs, designing 
an appropriate program for every prison where the government may want to 
implement a program would be expensive and somewhat tedious.168 Also, PbR 
programs result in increased costs when considering factors such as monitoring 
and paying providers and setting up and commissioning a PbR contract.169 
Measuring the impact itself may also prove challenging.170 Monitoring the 
provider’s performance requires the development and maintenance of a system 
to track the progress of the program both inside and outside of the prison.171 The 
PbR programs at Doncaster and Peterborough “were hampered because [the] 
MOJ had not established effective data sharing between its prison and probation 
systems and the police national computer when piloting began.”172 Additionally, 
regarding reconviction data, impact and data can be affected by outside factors, 
“such as police clear-up rates and the time taken to finalize cases.”173 
Another disadvantage of implementing a PbR program is that it could result 
in “undesirable strategic behavior” by the provider.174 By focusing on outcomes, 
PbR programs could create incentives for providers to cherry-pick, or “target 
people most likely to achieve a result, rather than those most in need.”175 Cherry-
picking can be avoided by not allowing contractors to have a choice in what 
inmates they are given.176 In the Social Impact Bond pilot at Peterborough, the 
MOJ determined that there was no evidence of cherry-picking within its One 
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Service program to help those who have a better chance of achieving better 
outcomes.177 Additionally, concerns over undesirable strategic behavior are not 
serious enough to stop experimenting with PbR.178 
The use of targets or performance measures could also lead to myopia, in 
which providers focus on “short-term gain to yield quick returns, leaving long-
term issues to build up.”179 By allowing providers to be a part of the contracting 
process and crafting the performance measures, they could easily manipulate the 
goals or choose easily achievable goals.180 In choosing the performance 
measures, they may focus on “measurable dimensions” rather than 
unmeasurable ones.181 A simple solution to this problem would be not to allow 
contractors to be part of setting the goals, and instead leave it to the “relevant 
contracting authority.”182 Setting targets which result in payment of the contract, 
or incentive payments, could also result in convergence where providers work 
towards “a standard level of performance rather than excellence.”183 Some 
scholars even argue that using a PbR program may encourage falsifying records 
to ensure targets are met.184 This strategic behavior may be linked, as previously 
mentioned, to the fact that PbR programs transfer the risk of experimentation to 
the providers who may feel pressure to act strategically to avoid major losses.185 
III. DISCUSSION ON PAYMENT-BY-RESULTS IMPLEMENTATION IN THE U.S. 
The U.K.’s PbR prison pilot programs provide two models to consider when 
determining what is appropriate for implementation in the United States. In 
making such a determination, it is important to look at: the evidence from both 
pilot programs; their applicability to the United States on the federal level; their 
applicability to the United States on the state level; and current U.S. private 
prison contracts. 
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A. Evidence from Peterborough and Doncaster 
The two PbR pilot programs in the United Kingdom began after 2010.186 
Due to its recent implementation and the government’s inability to run a pilot 
program at the Leeds public prison, the United Kingdom’s use of PbR in private 
and public prisons has not been fully tested.187 This recent implementation, and 
use of different models in the prisons, have not provided the United States with 
one reliable model that can be transplanted into the U.S. prison system. 
Both of the pilot programs at Peterborough and Doncaster showed some 
success in reducing the reconviction rate for cohort members.188 At the end of 
the Peterborough pilot, there was a 9% decrease in reconviction rates, which 
triggered the income payment.189 At Doncaster, the pilot was able to reduce 
reconviction rates by 3.3% which ultimately did not trigger the outcome 
payment.190 These statistics may not be accurate, as evidenced by the finding of 
the NAO in its 2015 report that the MOJ had not been collecting evidence and 
data of its PbR programs.191 Though only one program triggered the outcome 
payment, they were both able to reduce reconviction rates, which was the 
ultimate goal of the pilots.192 Since both pilots documented a reduction in 
reconviction rates due to the incentives given to the service providers, both pilots 
can serve as models for the United States to use when implementing their own 
PbR programs. The United States should continue to monitor studies coming 
from these two pilot programs as well as those mentioned in other parts of the 
world. 
B. The U.K.’s Payment-by-Results Programs Applicability to the U.S. State 
and Federal Governments 
As found by the NAO, PbR programs are difficult and costly to design.193 
Additionally, PbR programs are not a one-size-fits-all approach, and each 
program has to be carefully crafted to fit its context.194 There are a number of 
factors to consider when determining whether a PbR model should be used in 
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the United States, some of which include: scale of change, defining outcomes, 
measuring impact, and fiscal benefits.195 Designing a program that meets the 
context’s needs is imperative to determine whether a PbR program is right for 
the United States.196 Variables for developing a proper program include: “(1) the 
level at which results are specified, (2) the extent to which payment is based 
solely on outcomes, or whether a blend of outputs and outcomes are used, (3) 
the significance of PbR within the contract, and (4) at what level PbR is 
structured to alter incentives at the level of a system.”197 To determine if either 
of the U.K. pilot programs are applicable to U.S. state and federal prisons, this 
Comment will directly apply them to the U.S. context in which there are 102 
federal prisons and 1,719 state prisons.198  
The Peterborough pilot used an Social Impact Bond to fund its One Service 
program, which brought together community members to help define and solve 
the community problem of reoffending.199 To implement the One Service 
program, Social Finance paid the aforementioned community service providers 
to help offenders before and after release in an attempt to reduce their chance of 
reoffending.200 Implementing such a program at the federal level in the United 
States would be challenging, more so than at the state level, but is feasible. First, 
due to the philanthropic culture of the United States there would be a myriad of 
opportunities for funding an Social Impact Bond.201 There have been several 
PbR programs across the United States involving various social issues that have 
been able to find impact-seeking capital from investors to fund their various 
programs.202 For example, the first Social Impact Bond in the United States at 
New York Rikers Island jail was funded by an investment from Bloomberg 
Philanthropies and Goldman Sachs, which was protected by a philanthropy.203 
In 2017, Americans donated approximately $410.02 billion to charities.204 
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Additionally, the United States was found to be the most generous nation in the 
world when comparing the “rate of charitable donations as a percentage [of] 
gross domestic product.”205 Secondly, in the United States, service providers at 
each state and federal prison chosen to run a PbR program would replicate the 
local focus of the Peterborough pilot by bringing in local actors and 
organizations to help solve and define the problems in their community. 
The Doncaster pilot, on the other hand, used an alliance model to improve 
case management for cohort members before and after release.206 Throughout 
the pilot, case managers only facilitated access to interventions, rather than fully 
supplying interventions to offenders, which did not ensure that offenders would 
take advantage of them.207 Though case managers did not fully supply 
interventions to every offender,208 and the program did not trigger the outcome 
payment, the pilot was still able to lower reconviction rates.209 Learning from 
the experiences at Doncaster, service providers chosen to run a PbR program in 
a federal prison could ensure that more resources are allocated to case managers 
to effectively run the alliance model.  
Though the federal government has not yet implemented a PbR program, 
several states have already began exploring PbR in their prisons.210 Building of 
the models at Peterborough and Doncaster, in addition to developing their own 
models, states can contribute to experimentation advantage of PbR programs 
more readily than the federal government.  
Neither the Peterborough nor the Doncaster pilot programs are wholly 
appropriate for U.S. state or federal prisons due to the context driven nature of 
designing a PbR program. Nonetheless, both programs can serve as models for 
the federal government to learn from and improve upon when implementing 
potential PbR programs in federal prisons. Further, allowing states to take the 
lead on conducting PbR pilots would allow the federal government to draw from 
those experiences when designing their own PbR programs. However, that 
should not prevent the federal government from acting now. 
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C. Current U.S. Private Prison Contracts 
A major legal obstacle to implementing PbR programs in U.S. private 
prisons is determining whether it is possible to implement a PbR program under 
current private prison contracts, or if the government would have to wait until 
renewal negotiations. To determine the answer to this question, the parties to the 
contract would need to look at the specific contract language regarding 
amendments, and follow those procedures therein.211 Traditionally, if the terms 
of a contract are to be changed, the parties must draft an amendment on which 
they mutually agree, which then merges and becomes a part of the original 
contract upon signing.212 Though private prison companies can be incentivized 
to improve through performance measures, making them agree to terms that 
make it harder for them to earn a profit before the end of their current contract 
will be a hard obstacle to overcome. It is more likely that the parties will wait 
until it is time to renew the contract to add a PbR program into the agreement. 
Amending contracts would not be a hurdle for implementing a PbR program in 
publicly run facilities, which is another argument for increasing the use of PbR 
programs in the public sector. 
D. Other Practical Issues 
In addition to the difficulty of amending current private prison contracts, 
another issue to keep in mind when discussing the implementation of a PbR 
program in private prisons on the federal level is the recent reversal of private 
prison policy. In August 2016, the Department of Justice released a 
memorandum stating that it would reduce the amount of private prison contracts 
held by the Bureau of Prisons.213 In the memorandum, Deputy Attorney General 
Sally Yates cited the fact that private prisons do not substantially save on costs 
and do not provide the same level of services as federally run facilities as reasons 
for bringing an end to federal private prisons.214 This Obama era policy was 
quickly changed by the Trump Administration in February 2017 when Attorney 
General Jeff Sessions released a memorandum rescinding the previous 
administration’s “Reducing our Use of Private Prisons” memorandum.215 In the 
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memorandum, Sessions claims ending the use of private prisons “impaired the 
Bureau’s ability to meet the future needs of the federal correctional system.”216 
Since the federal government is once again embracing the use of private prisons 
and the discussion of PbR in federal private prisons should continue. 
In addition to the fluctuating policies at the federal level, there have been 
some changes in opinion among the states regarding private prisons. In 2017, 
there was a movement away from private prisons among the states in three major 
cities, New York City, Philadelphia and Portland, and in universities divesting 
from private prison companies.217 This movement away from private prisons 
among states does not preclude the implementation of PbR programs. 
Performance-based compensation in public prisons is also a feasible idea,218 as 
evidenced by the PbR program in Oklahoma219 and the cancelled PbR pilot at 
Leeds.220 Additionally, there has been a movement in the United States towards 
merit-based pay and promotions in various areas of the public sector, such as 
merit-based pay for teachers, which could be translated to prisons.221  
Further, throughout the United States, there is the belief that the government, 
rather than for-profit businesses, should be administering justice.222 However, 
there are counterarguments against this point of view that claim there is no 
inherent, or relevant, difference between private or publicly managed 
services.223 Alexander Volokh argues that the non-empirical arguments against 
privatization, such as the argument that states should provide certain services, 
are not relevant to the “employee-contractor distinction.”224 Volokh further 
argues that the distinction between employees and contractors is an 
administrative one, and that “contracting out is merely a retreat of state 
employment in favor of other forms of state contracting.”225 Also, many believe 
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that allowing for-profit businesses to take part in administering justice 
encourages them to not reduce reconviction rates, but to encourage the growth 
of mass incarceration to ensure they make a profit.226 This argument against 
private prisons depends entirely on how the compensation is structured. If the 
compensation is structured on the number of beds filled in the prison, then it is 
arguable that private prison companies would partake in undesirable strategic 
behavior to obtain high profits. A PbR compensation method on the other hand 
rewards private prison companies for reducing reconviction rates or achieving 
various other outcomes. Finally, though many people dislike the thought of 
contracting out to private prison companies, this argument should not prevent 
the implementation of PbR programs in public prisons. 
IV. POTENTIAL CRITICISMS 
There are several potential criticisms that suggest the U.K.’s PbR prison pilot 
programs should not be implemented at the federal or state levels in the United 
States.  
First, the PbR pilot prison program at Peterborough and Doncaster did not 
produce enough successful results to suggest either should be implemented in 
the United States. Out of the two pilot programs in the U.K., only one pilot was 
successful enough to trigger the outcome payment.227 Also, even though both 
prison pilots and the other PbR health and employment programs implemented 
in the U.K. demonstrated some successes,228 they are arguably not the right fit 
for or ready to be implemented in the United States. While only Peterborough 
triggered the outcome payment, both programs were able to reduce reconviction 
rates.229 Though the use of PbR in the area of corrections is new, the successes 
of PbR programs across the world suggest that incentives are effective when 
trying to reduce recidivism. Moreover, the U.S. federal and state governments 
should learn from the successes and failures of the Peterborough and Doncaster 
models when using them to implement PbR programs in the United States.  
Second, the type of outcome measures used in the PbR prison pilot programs 
are not appropriate for the United States. The U.K. PbR programs used a 
reduction in reconviction rates as their only outcome measure, when various 
other measures like violence, health care or overcrowding could have been 
 
 226 Margulies, supra note 222.  
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used.230 Additionally, the PbR contracts used an “intermediate reward scheme,” 
which combined discrete231 and continuous232 measures where the payment of 
the contract did not start until it reached the desired reduction of reconviction 
rates, and continued for every percentage point the reconviction rate decreased 
until it hit the cap.233 The use of discrete or binary measures can result in 
providers having little incentive to achieve higher than the set target which can 
be avoided through the use of continuous measures.234 While the use of only one 
somewhat discrete outcome measure in the U.K. PbR pilot programs is 
problematic, that does not prevent federal or state governments from taking the 
U.K.’s programs and building upon them by adding in additional outcome 
measures and compensation schemes. 
CONCLUSIONS 
A PbR program’s potential for improving outcomes in the criminal justice 
system is worth exploring in the United States, but it is important that the 
proscribed model is designed specifically for the U.S. and the specific prison in 
which it will be implemented. The two U.K. PbR pilot programs at Peterborough 
and Doncaster resulted in reduced reconviction rates, though only one program 
trigged the outcome payment.235 Consequently, these results, and the 
implementation of PbR programs in the United States and across the world 
suggest that the PbR programs used at Peterborough and Doncaster should serve 
as inspirations for the United States in designing their own PbR programs 
because any reduction in reconviction rates is beneficial.  
Though only one outcome measure, recidivism, was used in the U.K. pilot 
programs, that does not preclude the federal or state governments from 
introducing additional outcome measures like health care, prison violence, and 
 
 230 See generally MTC INST., supra note 135 (This article discusses a number of outcomes other than 
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cost savings into the contract.236 This has already been seen in New Zealand, 
where New Zealand’s government is using the outcome measures of death and 
prison violence in calculating payments or deductions on the contract.237 
Additionally, federal and state governments in the United States could build on 
the U.K.’s intermediate reward scheme combining both discrete and continuous 
measures. This would allow them to move towards an increased use of 
continuous measures which could allow more risk-adverse smaller corporations 
and nonprofits to get involved in PbR contracts. It would also incentivize 
providers to go above and beyond certain targets to achieve higher payments. 
With the myriad of PbR programs being implemented in the United States 
and abroad, the first step the federal government should take is to create a task 
force within the Department of Justice. This group would be tasked with 
monitoring the PbR programs currently taking place. Though these programs are 
relatively new, the U.S. can monitor them for success while crafting their own 
PbR program. The task force would also be responsible for comparing and 
contrasting the various models to determine which performance measures would 
best suit the needs of federal prisons. After choosing the appropriate 
performance measures and determining which goals they would want the 
providers to focus on, the task force should choose a federal prison in which to 
implement their pilot program and analyze what specific programs and resources 
would most benefit that particular location. Such task force would allow for the 
federal government to benefit from the experimentation among the states and 
the world, while also ensuring a federal PbR program is contextually designed. 
States and the federal government could also work with incentive advocacy 
groups like Instiglio238 to design and implement PbR programs in their public 
and private prisons. 
In conclusion, the prison PbR pilot programs at Peterborough and Doncaster 
can serve as excellent models for the U.S. federal and state governments to use 
when designing and implementing their own PbR programs, but they cannot be 
directly transferred to the United States due to the need to design a PbR programs 
under a U.S.-specific context. The lessons learned from Peterborough, 
Doncaster, and other PbR programs around the world will allow the United 
States to develop their own PbR programs to meet their unique needs while 
alleviating some of the issues that are currently running rampant in the U.S. 
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criminal justice system, such as overcrowding, recidivism, violence, and high 
costs.  
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